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The 1996 Amendment to the Basel Capital Accord, which allows, under certain conditions, the use
of internal models to calculate regulatory capital requirements for market risk, has resulted in an apparently 
sound supervisory trading book regime for internationally active banks.
Since this amendment was passed, the composition of the trading book has nevertheless changed 
substantially to include a more and more credit-related products such as credit derivatives and tranches 
of collateralised debt obligations (CDOs), as well as complex products such as hedge fund or fund of funds 
structured products. Furthermore, the contents of the trading book are expected to broaden due to the 
implementation of new international accounting and prudential standards.
This development has led to an increase in credit risk in the trading book and a concomitant rise in other 
risks such as default risk, event risk, liquidity risk, concentration risk and correlation risk, which were not 
adequately captured when market risk regulations were devised.
This has prompted:
• banks to improve their risk assessment and control systems for trading book activities. These systems 
still often use Value at Risk (VaR) calculations based on a uniform 10-day holding period, which does not 
always appear relevant;
• banking supervisors to enhance the supervision of these systems, in particular by ensuring that the 
measures proposed in July 2005 by the Basel Committee and the International Organisation of Securities 
Commissions (IOSCO), known as “Basel 2.5”, are correctly implemented. These measures aim to capture 
risks in the trading book in a more rigorous and comprehensive manner.ARTICLES
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1| AN APPARENTLY  
WELL-ESTABLISHED TRADING 
BOOK SUPERVISORY REGIME
The trading book supervisory regime introduced 
in 1996 requires credit institutions and investment 
ﬁ  rms to measure risks resulting from the transactions 
held in their trading book and to cover these risks 
by regulatory capital. This regime offers ﬁ  rms 
the use of either a standardised approach or an 
internal models approach to calculate the capital 
requirements associated with the trading book. 
Most major internationally active banks favour the 
internal models approach, built on the Value at Risk 
(VaR) methodology. Both the general risk, arising 
from general market movements, and the speciﬁ  c 
risk, related to changes in the credit quality of 
issuers, must notably be covered by adequate capital.
1|1 Deﬁ  nition of the trading book
In order to calculate regulatory capital requirements, 
credit institutions and investment ﬁ  rms classify 
their assets and off-balance-sheet items under one 
of the two following categories: the banking book, 
in which most medium- and long-term transactions 
are held and which is subject to regulatory capital 
requirements for the credit risk1 arising from these 
transactions; the trading book, which consists of 
positions in ﬁ  nancial instruments and commodities 
held either with trading intent or in order to hedge 
other elements of the trading book (see Box 1), and 
which is subject to capital requirements for market 
risk.2 In particular, the trading book includes most 
derivatives such as ﬁ  nancial futures, interest rate 
and currency swaps, options on securities, etc.
1|2 Capital  requirements 
for market risk
Capital requirements for market risk were introduced 
more recently than those for credit risk with 
the 1996 Amendment to the 1988 Capital Accord. 
Market risk includes: interest rate risk, equity 
position risk, settlement and counterparty risk and 
foreign exchange risk. With a view to limiting the 
vulnerability of institutions to these risks, the 1996 
Amendment allows banks to use either a standardised 
approach or an internal models approach to calculate 
their capital requirements.
Most major international banks have developed, in 
accordance with strict qualitative and quantitative 
criteria laid down by the regulators, internal models 
built on daily Value at Risk (VaR)3 measures, calculated 
from a number of risk factors: interest rate risk, foreign 
exchange risk, equity position risk, commodity price 
risk and option risk. Capital requirements are equal to 
the higher of the Value at Risk on the previous day or 
the average Value at Risk of the 60 previous business 
days, to which the competent supervisory authority 
applies a scaling factor of at least three depending 
on the quality of the risk management system and 
the accuracy of the model (see Box 2).
As regards the quality of the risk management 
system, banking supervisors require in particular, in 
Box 1
Prudential deﬁ  nition 
of the trading book
Positions held with trading intent are those that have been 
taken with a view to short-term sale and/or with the intent 
of beneﬁ  ting from actual or expected short-term price 
movements or to lock in arbitrage proﬁ  ts. Positions held 
for hedging other elements of the trading book are those 
taken with a view to offsetting, totally or to a large extent, 
the risk factors associated with these items. For institutions 
subject to International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRS), the trading book includes:
• ﬁ  nancial assets held at fair value through proﬁ  t and 
loss, i.e. those held for trading purposes, unless they are 
designated as effective hedging instruments;
• the temporary sales of securities and forward foreign 
exchange transactions, if they are carried out with a view 
to beneﬁ  ting from favourable interest rate movements or 
if they hedge other elements of the trading book;
• other transactions with credit institutions or investment 
ﬁ  rms, if they ﬁ  nance one or more elements of the trading 
book.
Source: Regulation 95–02 of 21 July 1995 on the prudential supervision of 
market risk, Advisory Committee on Financial Legislation and Regulation 
(CCLRF - le Comité consultatif de la législation et de la réglementation 
ﬁ  nancières ).
1  Requirements determined in France in accordance with the provisions of Regulation 91-05 on the solvency ratio.
2  Requirements determined in France in accordance with the provisions of Regulation 95-02 on the prudential supervision of market risks.
3  Lévy-Rueff (G.) (2005) for the different VaR calculation methods. ARTICLES
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environment and that they can be validated by 
backtesting. Lastly, a risk capital surcharge is applied 
to the use of such models if they inadequately capture 
event and default risk, equivalent to a multiplier of four.
2| AN INCREASE IN CREDIT RISK 
IN THE TRADING BOOK
Since the 1996 Amendment to the Capital Accord, 
banks have signiﬁ  cantly improved their modelling 
of market risk but, to date, no supervisory authority 
has authorised an institution using internal models 
to measure speciﬁ  c risk to apply a multiplier of less 
than four, given that the capture of event and default 
risk remains partial. Furthermore, the composition 
of Banks’ trading books has changed considerably 
over the past years to include more and more 
credit-related products, resulting in an attendant rise 
in event and default risk. This increase in credit risk 
in institutions’ trading books is mainly attributable to 
the fast development of the credit derivatives market 
and hedge fund structured products. Moreover, it is 
likely to grow further due to the application of the 
new international accounting (IFRS) and prudential 
(Basel II) standards.
2|1 Credit  derivatives
Initially used by banks to hedge and transfer the credit 
risk in their banking book, credit derivatives such as 
credit default swaps (CDSs) and collateralised debt 
obligations (CDOs) now form part of large institutions’ 
trading activities. They are mainly used to generate 
short-term gains on expected changes in credit risk and 
to offer investors products with a higher risk/return 
proﬁ  le. This development has been fuelled by the 
recent environment of low spreads and low volatility, 
which has prompted investors to seek higher yields.
While, at the end of 2000, the proportion of credit 
derivatives in the trading book of the main French 
banking groups only stood at 30% and 41% (for 
protection buying and selling respectively), it now 
stands at 93% and 98% (see Box 3). Nowadays, credit 
risk transfer instruments are used more widely 
for the dynamic management of portfolios than 
for hedging credit risk on banks’ balance sheets. 
This development was accompanied, as highlighted by 
the Report of the Joint Forum4 on Credit Risk Transfer 
addition to the existence of adequate internal control 
procedures, that internal models be closely integrated 
in the day-to-day risk management process and that 
operational limits be consistent with their modelling. 
The accuracy of the model is assessed on the basis 
of the number of exceptions (when observed losses 
exceed those calculated by the model) identiﬁ  ed by 
backtesting by the institutions.
1|3  General risk and speciﬁ  c risk
For interest rate risk and equity position risk, a 
distinction is made between general risk, i.e. the risk 
arising from general market movements (ﬂ  uctuations 
in the level of interest rates or general equity market 
movements), and speciﬁ  c risk, i.e. the risk related to 
the credit quality of issuers. While the current trading 
book regime aims to cover general risk and speciﬁ  c 
risk, internal models have been primarily designed 
to provide an alternative to the standardised measure 
of general risk and allow the effects of correlations 
across and within risk factors to be taken into account.
Although measuring speciﬁ  c risk under the internal 
models approach has also been allowed, it presents 
difﬁ  culties in terms of modelling a number of key 
variables such as event risk, deﬁ  ned as a signiﬁ  cant 
and/or sudden change in the price of a security 
in the wake of events affecting the issuer and 
often beyond the assumptions of VaR models (99% 
conﬁ  dence interval, 10-business-day holding period), 
or default risk, associated in particular with the 
sudden failure of an issuer (jump-to-default risk). 
The Basel Committee therefore made the use of 
internal models for measuring speciﬁ  c risk subject 
to additional conditions. In order to use estimates 
derived from modelling speciﬁ  c risk, these models 
must be able to explain ex ante historical changes in 
the value of the portfolio and capture concentrations 
in the composition of the portfolio. They must also 
demonstrate that they remain reliable in an adverse 
Box 2
Calculation of capital requirements 
under the internal models approach
FP = Max  VaR
j , (      VaR
j / 60) x (3 + additional factor)  Σ (
j –1
j – 60 )
Source: General Secretariat of the Commission bancaire.
4  The Joint Forum, established in 1996, is a forum for dialogue and exchange between the three international organisations charged with setting the standards 
applicable to the ﬁ  nancial sector: the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), the International Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO)
and the International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS).ARTICLES
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(October 2004), by a growing sophistication of trading 
instruments and strategies: arbitrage CDOs (synthetic 
CDOs), CDOs of CDOs (CDOs-squared), STCDOs 
(single tranche CDOs), correlation trading, etc.
2|2  Hedge fund structured products
The development of banks’ hedge fund activities has 
also led to an increase in credit risk in the trading 
book. In addition to ﬁ  nancing granted in the form of 
credit facilities and repos, trading operations in the 
form of ﬁ  nancial derivatives and prime brokerage 
activities,5 the major international banks have been 
developing their marketing of hedge fund or fund 
of funds structured products. These products, such 
as Constant Proportion Portfolio Insurance (CPPI)
–see Box 4– aim to offer investors a capital guarantee 
plus a return indexed on the performance of a hedge 
Box 4
Constant Proportion Portfolio Insurance (CPPI )
CPPI products offer investors a capital guarantee 
(“principal-protected”) as well as a return indexed 
on the performance of a high-yield risky asset, for 
example an equity stake in a hedge fund. In order to 
be able to guarantee the repayment of the principal, 
the bank invests the capital put forward by the client 
in both risk-free and risky assets, with the allocation 
between the two types of asset varying according 
to the performance of the hedge fund; the greater 
the proportion invested in risky assets, the higher 
the potential return, and vice versa. The risk for the 
institution is low in normal market conditions, but may 
increase in the event of adverse developments that 
push the liquidation value of the risky asset below 
the level that allows the institution to purchase the 
risk-free assets needed to guarantee repayment of 
the principal at maturity.
Box 3
Changes in the notional amount and the classiﬁ  cation of credit derivatives
 used by the main French banks
Changes in the notional amount of credit derivatives 
used by the main French banks. 
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Source: General Secretariat of the Commission bancaire.
5  Prime brokers offer hedge funds a wide range of services: ﬁ  nancing in the form of securities and/or cash loans, execution of orders, settlement and clearing of 
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fund or a fund of funds. Equity stakes in hedge funds 
or in funds of funds, purchased by banks in order 
to structure such products are usually booked in 
the trading book. They contribute to the total VaR 
of the trading portfolio and are therefore subject to 
capital requirements calculated under the internal 
models approach.
2|3 New  accounting 
and prudential standards 
Lastly, the International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS) are also likely to lead to an 
increase in credit risk in the trading book. Until 
these standards were adopted (1 January 2005 in 
Europe6), positions booked in the banking book were 
subject to different accounting treatment (accrual) 
than those booked in the trading book (market 
value). Yet, the implementation of IFRS results in 
an extension of the scope of the application of fair 
value accounting, which is closely based on market 
value,7 to non-trading activities. This removal of the 
differences in accounting treatments tends to blur 
the boundary between the banking book and the 
trading book and could broaden the contents of the 
latter, especially since the capital requirements for 
credit risk in the trading book are lower than those 
for the banking book (see section 3|1).
Furthermore, the fact that institutions subject to IFRS 
generally have to measure at fair value instruments 
held to hedge other elements accounted on an 
accrual basis in the banking book, in particular credit 
derivatives hedging loans, is a source of accounting 
mismatch. In order to prevent such a mismatch, 
which results in volatility in the P&L accounts, banks 
could more systematically book all these items in 
the trading book, which may be contrary to the 
prudential criteria laid down for the booking of such 
transactions (see Box 5).
6  For the consolidated accounts of companies listed on an organised European market.
7  Amis (P.) and Rospars (É.) (2005) for changes in international accounting standards.
Box 5
Criteria for classifying credit derivatives in the trading book
In order to be booked in the trading book, credit derivatives must be purchased with trading intent or for the purpose 
of hedging other elements of the trading book. They must be free of any restrictive covenants on their tradability or be 
able to be hedged completely.
Moreover, the General Secretariat of the Commission bancaire may object to a credit derivative being recorded in the 
trading book if the institution does not have the necessary resources and experience to actively manage them or if it 
does not have adequate systems and controls.
In order to be eligible for the trading book, all the following conditions must be satisﬁ  ed:
• the institution must have a clearly documented trading strategy for credit derivatives which has been approved by 
senior management; 
• there must be clearly deﬁ  ned procedures including, in particular, a system of limits and daily tracking of their observance;
• a daily, conservative valuation must be carried out, either at market prices or with reference to a model that has been validated 
by the internal risk monitoring division and that has not been objected to by the institution’s internal or external auditors;
• an active monitoring of positions must be carried out, including in particular an evaluation of the quality and availability 
of market data used in the valuation process, the volume of transactions, and the size of the positions traded;
• the institution must have in place a system of reporting to senior management as part of its global monitoring of the 
management of risks arising from the institution’s trading activities;
• valuations at market prices or with reference to a model must take into account liquidity risk and modelling risk, using 
a methodology that has been approved by senior management.
Source: General Secretariat of the Commission bancaire/Procedures for calculating the international solvency ratio.ARTICLES
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Lastly, the removal, in the new capital adequacy 
framework (Basel II), of the current cap associated 
with the minimum capital requirements (8% of 
risk-weighted assets) applied to positions in the 
banking book may encourage banks to transfer part 
of these assets, in particular high-risk positions, to the 
trading book. Indeed, the spectrum of risk weights 
in Basel II is much broader than in the 1988 Accord 
and will result in the application of risk weights 
of over 100% (current maximum) to exposures on 
counterparties with a high probability of default.
3| AN INCOMPLETE ASSESSMENT 
  OF RISKS IN THE TRADING BOOK
In addition to the increase in default and event risk, 
the growing presence, in the trading book, of credit 
risk transfer instruments and complex and structured 
products, which are generally less liquid, has resulted 
in an escalation of certain types of risk. The latter, 
which include liquidity risk, concentration risk and 
correlation risk, are not fully addressed in current 
regulations on market risk.
3|1 Liquidity  risk
The liquidity of a ﬁ  nancial instrument plays a key role 
in determining the holding period for a bank of such an 
instrument and therefore in assessing the regulatory 
capital requirement to which it is subject. In general, 
credit risk in the trading book is subject to lower 
regulatory capital requirements than in the banking 
book. For instance, under the standardised approach, 
selling protection through a credit derivative with a 
notional of 100 and whose underlying reference entity 
has a minimum rating of BBB- (investment grade) 
would generate a credit risk capital requirement
of 8 in the banking book compared to a speciﬁ  c risk 
capital requirement of only 1.6 in the trading book. 
This difference, often accentuated when the internal 
models approach is used to measure speciﬁ  c risk, can 
be mainly attributed to the different time horizons 
on which the risks are assessed: one year for credit 
risk (corresponding to a horizon for estimating the 
probability of default of the issuer) and ten days for 
market risk (corresponding to a horizon for the closing 
out or hedging of positions). 
The preferential treatment granted to the trading 
book can be ascribed to the fact that the positions 
are held for short-term sale and they can be easily 
unwound or hedged on the market. However, in 
practice, this is often not the case.
Admittedly, the liquidity of credit derivatives 
is tending to increase, in particular for the most 
standard products (such as single-name credit 
default swaps) and, more generally, due to the 
creation of standardised indices for credit default 
swaps.8 Nevertheless, the assumption that positions 
can be closed out or hedged within ten days, 
which is currently used as a basis for calculating 
capital requirements using VaR models, may prove 
inappropriate for the increasingly frequent case of 
complex structured products. For instance, equity 
stakes in hedge funds or in funds of funds held for 
hedging structured products that are sold to investors 
are generally booked by banks in the trading book 
even though the liquidity of these equity stakes is 
limited given the narrowness of the market and the 
low frequency at which the issuing funds may redeem  
them (usually on a monthly or quarterly basis and 
sometimes on a half-yearly basis). The inclusion 
of such equity stakes in the trading book therefore 
generally results in insufﬁ  cient capital requirements, 
as they only marginally contribute to the VaR on the 
institutions’ overall trading portfolio.
Moreover, the lack of observable prices or values 
in active markets that can be used in the daily 
valuation of these exposures increases the liquidity 
risk associated with such positions even further. 
The results of the survey conducted, in April 2005, by 
the Basel Committee among 47 international banks9 
show that a very signiﬁ  cant proportion of all the 
positions booked in the trading book could not be 
valued with an active reference market, and over a 
quarter of these positions were on credit derivatives.
3|2 Concentration  risk
In this survey, concentration risk is also cited by 
institutions as being particularly difﬁ  cult to capture 
in VaR measures across products (credit, interest rate, 
foreign exchange, equity, and commodities products). 
While enabling banks to diversify their exposures across 
different sectors of the economy and different credit 
quality segments, the rapid development of the credit 
8  iTraxx in Europe, CDX in the United States.
9  BCBS (2005), “Trading book survey: A summary of responses”, April .ARTICLES
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risk transfer market and in particular the CDO market 
has nevertheless made it necessary for institutions 
to enhance the sensitivity of their internal models to 
concentration risk in the trading book. Indeed, most 
CDOs include the same names in their reference 
portfolio, giving rise to concentration risk on an entity 
and/or a sector associated with their widespread use 
in institutions’ active credit portfolio management.10
3|3 Correlation  risk 
More generally, current models do not fully capture 
the growing complexity of products or all the 
parameters that could inﬂ  uence the risks associated 
with them. In particular, as the BIS 75th Annual 
Report stresses, much progress remains to be made 
in assessing the risk proﬁ  les of highly-leveraged 
instruments such as CDOs and CDOs of CDOs 
and their sensitivity to correlations between 
probabilities of default. The credit risk correlations 
across names in a given reference portfolio are 
most often calculated, in order to price the risk, 
using a one-factor Gaussian copula model that is 
based on strong theoretical assumptions (identical 
constant default time correlations across all names, 
normal joint default probability distribution) and not 
empirically tested.11 An increase in trading in such 
instruments, mispriced in relation to the real risk 
incurred, would constitute a structural risk.
10  Cousseran (O.) and Rahmouni (I.) (2005): “The CDO market –Functioning and implications in terms of ﬁ  nancial stability”.
11  Amato (J.) et Gyntelberg (J.) (2005).
Box 6
The point of view of De Nederlandsche Bank 
by Jan Brockmeijer, Director of the Financial Stability Division
The banking and the trading book in prudential regulation 
Traditionally, the international capital adequacy rules for banks distinguish between the banking book and the trading book. 
This distinction has its rationale, because banking book items run into longer-term credit and other risks that deserve 
a different capital adequacy regime. Typically, in the banking book “non-tradable” ﬁ  nancial instruments are recorded, 
i.e. instruments that are difﬁ  cult to value at market prices and to sell to third parties. These instruments, such as bank 
loans, are generally intended to be held on the balance sheet until maturity. The trading book traditionally is reserved for 
ﬁ  nancial instruments held for short-term proﬁ  t taking (“trading intent”) or in order to hedge other elements of the trading 
book; these instruments should be liquid and valued at market value. The latter implies that any change in value of a trading 
book instrument immediately shows up in the P&L and capital. Given its focus on tradability, the trading book capital regime 
measures risk exposure on the premise of a ten-day holding period, consistent with a feasible liquidation horizon, whereas 
the banking book capital regime is based on a much longer holding period. As a result, the capital charge on instruments 
recorded in the trading book may be substantially lower than the same instruments held in the banking book.
Blurring of the banking and the trading book – movement towards the trading book
The distinction between the banking and the trading book is gradually becoming more artiﬁ  cial, because of a variety of 
–often intertwined– developments that have led to a blurring of the borders between the two books and to a gradual shift 
towards the trading book. Some examples are: 
• banks increasingly use credit risk transfer (CRT) instruments to trade credit risk. For instance, a bank might securitise 
a credit portfolio held in its banking book by using CDOs, creating junior (high default risk) and senior (low default risk) 
tranches. Banks that buy credit risk may well be inclined to hold the junior tranches in their trading book, even though 
these are not very liquid; 
• moreover, the different prudential treatment of the banking book and the trading book –in combination with new accounting 
standards promoting valuation at market or fair value– has created incentives for banks seeking to hedge risks related 
to banking book items to place more positions in the trading book. To reduce non-trading income volatility and in order 
to beneﬁ  t from the more lenient capital charges, banks have an incentive to place both the hedged item as well as the 
associated hedge together as “economic hedge” in the trading book.
• Finally, some hedge fund performance related products are recorded in the trading book, although their risk characteristics 
do not comply with the tradability condition of a trading book treatment.ARTICLES
Better capturing risks in the trading book
58  Banque de France • Financial Stability Review • No. 8 • May 2006
4| ENHANCING THE TRADING
  BOOK SUPERVISORY REGIME
In order to better capture the risks that might affect 
their ﬁ  nancial soundness, most major internationally 
active banks have been developing both economic 
capital calculations, integrating in particular credit 
and market risks, and stress testing. These tools will 
be increasingly scrutinised by banking supervisors 
under the supervisory review process (Pillar 2) of 
the New Basel Accord. Furthermore, through the 
implementation of measures known as “Basel 2.5”, 
supervisors will enhance the oversight of systems 
set up by banks for measuring and managing risks 
within their trading book.
4|1 Economic  capital
  and stress testing
Most major internationally active banks have been 
developing tools for calculating economic capital 
integrating, in particular, credit and market risks and 
their different components. Economic capital12 for all 
types of risk is generally calculated at the one-year 
horizon with a conﬁ  dence interval determined by 
the bank on the basis of the probability of default 
corresponding to its current or targeted rating. 
While the main tool for measuring economic capital 
associated with market risk often remains a VaR 
calculation based on a 10-day holding period, some 
institutions have devised complementary approaches 
using stress testing and/or scaling up the VaR to 
The general trend is that due to the rise of CRT and other hedging instruments, through which the underlying risk components 
like credit and interest rate risk can be hedged within an assumed short-term horizon, institutions are inclined to hold more 
and more ﬁ  nancial instruments in their trading portfolio, even though the liquidity of some of them can be questioned. 
The result is that a higher concentration of risks –speciﬁ  c credit risk (default and event risk) and liquidity, correlation and 
concentration risk– enters the trading book, which was not originally designed for that purpose. 
Regulatory reaction
One factor behind this shift towards the trading book is the fact that, under the new Basel Accord, the approach towards 
risks run in the trading book and that towards risks run in the banking book do not fully concur with each other. For 
example, the banking book requirements do not take into account diversiﬁ  cation of credit risk, while this aspect reduces the 
calculated risk in the trading book regime. To strengthen the alignment between the prudential regulatory framework and 
current practice and to reduce potential regulatory arbitrage, the trading book capital regime –in particular the regulations 
on default risk– has to be designed in a way equivalent with the regime adopted for the banking book. With the publication 
of the Basel II capital framework in the summer of 2004, the Basel Committee stressed the importance of addressing the 
increased market liquidity and default risks in the trading book. In July 2005, the BCBS and IOSCO presented further 
improvements to the trading book regime. Most important elements are:
• the provision that banks must have policies and procedures for placing items in the trading account for capital purposes 
–to prevent regulatory arbitrage;
• that trading positions that cannot be sold or hedged in liquid markets within ten days are subject to an incremental default 
risk charge. In addition, the introduction of the fair value option under IFRS might reduce the incentive for a bank to place 
its hedged item and the associated hedge in the trading book. 
Future challenge
It remains to be seen whether these recent regulatory changes will be sufﬁ  cient to mitigate the practice of banks to place 
less liquid instruments in the trading book, for which this book was not originally designed. Due to the lack of sufﬁ  cient, 
reliable data to measure and price credit risks, particularly during stress conditions, the distinction between banking book 
and trading book has its merits in the present environment. In the longer term however, with the increasing potential for 
modelling and trading credit risks, the development of a uniform regulatory framework capturing all kind of risks poses 
new and difﬁ  cult challenges for regulators.
12  Tiesset (M.) and Troussard (P.) (2005) for the difference between economic capital and regulatory capital. ARTICLES
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their daily marking-to-market meant that they 
rarely qualify for inclusion in the trading book;
• the use of prudent valuation methods for less 
liquid trading book positions and, where necessary, 
higher valuation adjustments than those made under 
standard accounting practice;
• the taking into account, under the internal models 
approach, of the results of stress testing in the 
assessment of capital adequacy;
• the capture of event risk by internal models used 
to measure speciﬁ  c risk, and the calculation of 
an incremental capital charge for default risk not 
captured in the VaR-based calculation;
• the use of more robust modelling standards for 
speciﬁ  c risk and the conduct of more complete 
backtesting and model validation tests.
Banks that have already received speciﬁ  c risk model 
recognition will have to meet these requirements by 
1 January 2010. If they fail to do so, they will have to 
use the standardised rules for speciﬁ  c risk.
PILLAR 2: SUPERVISORY REVIEW PROCESS
The measures adopted require banks to make a 
comprehensive assessment of risks in their trading 
book. They aim to ensure that these risks are 
adequately covered by economic capital, taking 
into account the output of the VaR model, valuation 
adjustments and stress testing. These measures require 
banks using internal models to demonstrate that:
• they hold enough internal capital to withstand a 
range of severe but plausible market shocks;
• internal capital assessments include an assessment 
of market concentration and liquidity risks under 
stressed market conditions;
• stress testing factors include market risks that 
are not adequately captured in the VaR model, for 
instance, non linear/deep out-of-the-money products, 
jumps-to-defaults, signiﬁ  cant shifts in correlations;
• their different risk measurement techniques are 
used in an appropriate manner to arrive at the overall 
internal capital assessment for market risk (VaR, 
stress testing, etc.).
reﬂ  ect a horizon for closing out or hedging positions 
assumed to exceed ten days.
Furthermore, although modelling credit risk 
correlations is not as yet common practice, progress 
is being made in this area. Some models now 
incorporate contagion effects, which allow banks 
using them to capture the impact on credit risk from 
declines in overall market liquidity,13 the failure of 
large ﬁ  rms or adverse industry-level developments. 
Such approaches make it possible to better take into 
account extreme or tail risks as well as liquidity risk. 
Banking supervisors, in addition to the increase in 
the current VaR multiplier and/or the opposition to 
the inclusion of certain items in the trading book, 
will enhance the review and the assessment of 
the methods developed by banks to calculate and 
monitor their economic capital, as proposed in the 
International Convergence of Capital Measurement 
and Capital Standards: a Revised Framework 
(Basel II).14
4|2 “Basel  2.5”
In  July 2005,  the  Basel Committee  and  IOSCO 
proposed a series of measures,15 known as “Basel 2.5”, 
that aim to improve the trading book regulatory 
regime. The proposed improvements follow the 
Basel II architecture, based on three complementary 
pillars:
PILLAR 1: MINIMUM CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS 
The measures adopted aim to clarify the types of 
exposures that qualify for inclusion in the trading 
book, provide further guidance on prudent valuation 
methods for these exposures and stress testing, and 
strengthen modelling standards for market risk. 
These measures require banks to meet following 
requirements:
• the implementation of a clear set of policies 
and procedures for determining which positions 
could be included in, and which should be 
excluded from, the trading book. In this respect, 
the Committee decided that open equity stakes 
in hedge funds should be booked in the banking 
book, considering that their very limited 
liquidity and the uncertainty surrounding 
13  Bervas (A.) (2006): “Taking market liquidity into account in risk management”.
14  Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), November 2005.
15  BCBS (2005): “The application of Basel II to trading activities and the treatment of double default effects”, July.ARTICLES
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PILLAR 3: MARKET DISCIPLINE
Lastly, the additional disclosure requirements under 
Pillar 3 aim to improve the quality of information 
disclosed relating to the trading book. In this 
respect, banks are subject to the following disclosure 
requirements:
• qualitative information on trading book valuation 
techniques;
•  the soundness standard used for modelling 
purposes;
• the methodologies used to achieve the firm’s 
internal capital adequacy assessment.
First, the “Basel 2.5” measures should strengthen the trading book supervisory regime. The implementation 
of these measures will be scrutinised by national banking supervisors and the Basel Committee. For this 
purpose, a working group was set up by the Committee in Autumn 2005: the Accord Implementation Group 
on Trading Book.
Second, these measures will result in an increase in the level of capital charges associated with trading book 
positions that are less liquid or incur a high default risk. They will thus promote the convergence of the level 
of capital required to cover such positions between the banking book and the trading book and so reduce 
the possibilities of regulatory arbitrage. 
Lastly, in the longer term, they may provide an opportunity, beyond the already scheduled review of the prudential 
recognition of the use of internal credit risk models, to examine the possibility of adopting an economic and 
regulatory approach that is more focused on risks themselves than the way these risks are booked.ARTICLES
Better capturing risks in the trading book
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